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Abstract: 
 
The construction of any kind of sustained political violence, including large-scale 
counter-terrorism campaigns, requires a powerful political discourse capable of enlisting 
widespread consent and subduing dissent. Employing the methodology of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA), this paper examines the key features and characteristics of the 
discourse of Bush Jr‟s second „war on terrorism‟, in large measure by comparing it to the 
first „war on terrorism‟ inaugurated by Reagan. I argue that the genealogical roots of 
Bush Jr‟s counter-terrorism policies can be found in the discursive constructions at the 
heart of Reagan‟s approach, and that both discourses make similar appeals to formative 
American political narratives. The paper also argues that the Bush Jr and Reagan „wars 
on terrorism‟ have functioned in similar ways to structure overall foreign policy 
formation, write American identity, reflexively construct external threats, and discipline 
internal and external opponents. Finally, the paper suggests that it is possible to critique 
American counter-terrorism policy from both an ethical-normative perspective, and a 
realist-pragmatic viewpoint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
The enactment of any large-scale project of political violence—such as war or counter-
terrorism—necessitates a significant degree of political and social consensus. For any 
government to commit enormous amounts of public resources and risk the lives of its 
citizens in military conflict, it has to persuade both the political establishment and the 
wider society that such an undertaking is necessary, desirable, and achievable. The 
process of inducing such widespread consent calls for the construction of a powerful 
public discourse that manufactures approval while simultaneously suppressing individual 
doubts and circumventing the organization of political opposition. Thus, a major counter-
terrorism campaign—a „war on terrorism‟, for example—manifestly consists of both a set 
of institutional practices (military and intelligence operations, diplomatic initiatives, 
special government departments and security bodies, standard operating procedures, new 
laws and procedures), and an accompanying discursive project. The discursive dimension 
of counter-terrorism entails the construction and continual amplification and reproduction 
of an entire political language—a discourse—complete with its own ontological 
assumptions, symbolic systems, rhetorical modes and tropes, metaphors, narratives and 
meanings, and exclusive forms of knowledge. The language of counter-terrorism then 
functions to establish the vocabulary and parameters of public debate, as well as to 
legitimize, normalize, reify, and co-constitute the institutional practices of counter-
terrorism.
2
 From this perspective, a fully informed understanding of past and present 
„wars against terrorism‟ is impossible without a critical analysis of the language of 
counter-terrorism. 
 Unfortunately, while studies on the military, diplomatic, geo-political, and legal 
aspects of American counter-terrorism are voluminous,
3
 apart from a few notable 
exceptions,
4
 studies on the ideational and discursive dimensions of counter-terrorism 
projects are few and far between. In addition, there are as yet very few studies which 
compare the discursive dimensions of counter-terrorism between different 
administrations. Given the continuities between the Reagan and Bush Jr presidencies in 
terms of key personnel, ideological orientation, political support networks, and foreign 
policy priorities, as well as the fact that both administrations enacted major and costly 
„wars on terrorism‟, this seems surprising. The aim of this paper therefore, is to undertake 
a comparative critical discourse analysis of the official language of Ronald Reagan‟s and 
George W. Bush Jr‟s „wars on terrorism‟. The overall argument is fairly simple: The 
genealogical origins of the post-September 11, 2001 „war on terrorism‟ rests firmly in the 
discursive construction of counter-terrorism during the Reagan administration. The 
similarities in discourse and practice between these two „wars on terrorism‟ are more than 
simply epiphenomenal or coincidental; rather, they are embedded in the discursive 
practices of American foreign policy and political life itself. Moreover, at the political 
level, they function in similar ways to write American identity, discipline domestic and 
foreign opponents, and reify state power. 
This paper is divided into four main sections. The initial section briefly describes 
the methodology employed in the study. Section two critically analyses and compares the 
counter-terrorism discourses of the Reagan and Bush Jr administrations. The third section 
draws together some conclusions about the essential characteristics of the two discourses. 
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Finally, in the conclusion, I explore the practical and ethical dangers of American 
counter-terrorism policy under Reagan and Bush Jr.  
 
Methodological Approach 
 
The methodological approach I have employed to examine the official language of these 
„wars on terrorism‟ is known broadly as critical discourse analysis (CDA). This approach 
is at once both a technique for analysing specific texts or speech acts, and a way of 
understanding the relationship between discourse and social and political phenomena. By 
engaging in concrete, linguistic textual analysis—that is, by doing systematic analyses of 
spoken and written language—CDA aims to shed light on the links between texts and 
societal practices and structures, or, the linguistic-discursive dimension of social action.
5
 
The approach is based on a number of crucial assumptions. It assumes that discourse is a 
form of social practice which both makes or constitutes the social world, and is at the 
same time constituted by other social practices. Discourses both contribute to the shaping 
of social structures and are also shaped by them; there is a dialectical relationship 
between the two. Of even greater import, CDA assumes that discursive practices are 
never neutral, but rather that they possess a clear ideological character; they are the 
construction and deployment of „meaning in the service of power.‟6 Or, more 
specifically, discourses act as constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, 
reproduction, and transformation of relations of domination in society.
7
 Thus, a central 
aim of CDA lies in revealing the means by which language is deployed to construct and 
maintain power. What makes CDA „critical‟ is its normative commitment to positive 
social change. 
In terms of studying the role and use of language, there are two levels at which 
CDA functions. First, it engages directly with specific texts in an effort to discover how 
discursive practices operate linguistically within those texts. Second, because individual 
text analysis is not sufficient on its own to shed light on the relationship between 
discourse and social processes, CDA adds a wider interdisciplinary perspective which 
combines textual and social-political analysis.
8
 In essence, CDA involves carefully 
reading a specific text—such as a speech, interview, or radio address—and subjecting it 
to a series of analytical questions: What assumptions, beliefs and values underlie the 
language in the text? How does the grammar, syntax and sentence construction reinforce 
the meanings and effects of the discursive constructions contained in the text? What are 
the histories and embedded meanings of the important words in the text? What patterns 
can be observed in the language, and how do different parts of the text relate to each 
other? What knowledge or practices are normalised by the language in the text? How 
does the language create, reinforce or challenge power relations in society? Finding 
answers to these questions goes some way towards understanding how discourses work to 
construct social processes and structures in ways that reproduce power relations. 
In my analysis of the language of the two „wars on terrorism‟, I chose to focus 
mainly on the speeches, interviews and public addresses given by senior members of the 
Reagan and Bush Jr administrations.
9
 I analysed over 150 speeches, interviews, radio 
broadcasts, press releases, and statements to Congress between 1981 and 1988 in the first 
time period, and September 11, 2001 and January 31, 2004 in the second. These texts 
were a representative sample of more than 6,000 official texts on the subject of terrorism 
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and counter-terrorism for these two periods. I began by examining all the important 
speeches that garnered major public attention or were of great symbolic importance, such 
as State of the Union addresses, special speeches on terrorism or terrorism-related crises, 
the September 11 and September 20, 2001 addresses to the American people, and 
anniversary and commemorative speeches. Lastly, I tried to ensure a selection of different 
speakers, from the president to cabinet members and senior ambassadors, as well as texts 
broadly covering each entire period.  
 
Writing Wars Against Terrorism: Ronald W. Reagan and George W. Bush Jr
10
  
 
An examination of the Reagan administration‟s language of counter-terrorism 
demonstrates unequivocally that the current „war on terrorism‟ is genealogically rooted in 
this earlier period of American counter-terrorism policy. There is an extraordinary level 
of replication and mimicry of the central themes and narratives in every important 
dimension of the discourse. Both administrations discursively constructed the terrorist 
challenge and the counter-terrorism response in largely identical ways, despite the vastly 
different geo-political contexts in which they operated and the magnitude of the security 
threat each faced. This suggests that the first „war on terrorism‟ was crucial for 
establishing the vocabulary and parameters of subsequent counter-terrorism discourse. 
 
Terrorism as War 
 
The most significant discursive move of any counter-terrorism campaign involves 
reconstructing terrorist attacks as „acts of war.‟ Both the Reagan and Bush Jr „wars on 
terrorism‟ followed this same rhetorical path. For example, the Reagan administration 
discursively re-constructed instances of anti-American terrorism as „acts of war‟, rather 
than as crime, insurgency, or simply kidnappings, bombings, hijackings, and the like. 
Speaking about the kidnapping of American citizens in Lebanon for example, Reagan 
declared that, „Their acts of terror constitute a declaration of war on civilized society;‟11 
earlier he had stated that America „would not tolerate what amounts to acts of war against 
the American people.‟12 In another speech, Reagan suggested that so-called „terrorist 
states‟—nations that sponsor terrorism—are „now engaged in acts of war against the 
Government and people of the United States.‟13 Secretary George Shultz echoed this 
formulation when he said that terrorism is „not just criminal activity but an unbridled 
form of warfare‟ and that „terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool of 
warfare.‟14 Virtually every description of terrorism in the official speeches of the Reagan 
administration follows this same rhetorical pattern. Historically, this represented 
something of a departure in counter-terrorism discourse; previously, acts of terrorism had 
most often been described simply as hijacking, hostage taking, assassination, bombings, 
killings, and the like.
15
 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush Jr administration articulated 
a very similar discursive construction, although with a slight variation in its chronological 
evolution. In the immediate aftermath of the devastating attacks, Bush Jr described them 
as „deliberate and deadly terrorist acts‟ and „despicable acts of terror.‟16 In other words, 
there was at first no mention of „war‟. However, in a discursive sleight of hand, the 
attacks were then rhetorically reborn in subsequent days as an „act of war‟. Bush Jr 
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asserted that „war has been waged against us,‟17 and „the wreckage of New York City‟ 
was „the first battle of war.‟18 Directly related to this, the victims of the September 11, 
2001 attacks were reclaimed in a powerful discursive act as „combat casualties‟ rather 
than „terrorist victims‟. Donald Rumsfeld achieved this by announcing that the members 
of the armed forces killed in the attack on the Pentagon would be given war medals:  
 
They were acts of war, military strikes against the United States of America. As such, 
those Department of Defense employees who were injured or killed were not just victims of 
terror. They were combat casualties […] [T]he members of the armed forces that were 
killed or injured in the September 11th attack on the Pentagon and on the World Trade 
Center towers will receive the Purple Heart. As you know, the Purple Heart is given to 
those killed or wounded in combat.
19
 
 
This was a powerful symbolic act that remade the terrorist attacks as fully „war‟ and the 
victims as „casualties of war‟. This discursive construction directly echoed Reagan‟s use 
of the term „prisoners of war‟ to describe the American hostages in Lebanon in the 
1980s.
20
  
These discursive renderings of terrorist acts by Reagan and Bush Jr were central 
to placing counter-terrorism in an understandable „war‟ narrative, and justifying a 
military rather than a criminal justice response. Moreover, discursively reconstructing 
terrorist attacks as „acts of war‟ functioned to confer on the state powers reserved for the 
supreme emergency, as well as domestic and international justification for military-based 
self-defense. The language worked to thoroughly normalize a military response—a „war 
on terrorism‟. Interestingly, both administrations described terrorism as „acts of war‟ 
regardless of the scale of the attack: Reagan‟s description of „acts of war‟ referred to the 
kidnapping of a small number of Americans in Lebanon, while Bush Jr‟s identical 
language referred to the devastating World Trade Center attacks that killed 3,000 people. 
This illustrates the degree to which foreign policy responses are a discursive construction 
rather than the objective reflection of a real problem—identical language is employed to 
describe entirely different realities. 
 
The Threat of Terrorism 
 
At the heart of every counter-terrorism campaign is a ubiquitous narrative of threat and 
danger. In both „wars on terrorism‟, the problem of terrorist violence was established as 
urgent, dramatic, and without precedent. For example, Reagan argued that „In recent 
years, a very worrisome and alarming new kind of terrorism has developed.‟21 Stressing 
the unprecedented quality of the terrorist violence functions to legitimize unprecedented 
government measures: a „new‟ kind of terrorism obviously necessitates a „new‟ kind of 
counter-terrorism. In addition to its construction as a wholly „new‟ threat, the Reagan 
administration rhetorically constructed terrorism as a threat of truly staggering 
proportions. In a speech to Congress for example, the president asserted that: „The 
training and support of terrorist groups and activities by a number of countries has 
reached alarming proportions. In addition, the number of states now using terrorism as 
an instrument of foreign policy is both increasing and highly disturbing‟; it „has thus 
become a matter of grave concern to national security.‟ He went on to state that terrorism 
posed a „growing threat to our way of life‟, it had become „a frightening challenge to the 
 5 
tranquility and political stability of our friends and allies‟, it was a „growing source of 
danger to us, our friends, and our allies‟, and was „a severe challenge to America‟s 
foreign policy.‟ Even more than this, he concluded that terrorism posed an apocalyptic 
threat to „all mankind.‟22 Reagan also spoke frequently of the „the deadly menace of 
international terror‟23 which posed a „pervasive and insidious threat to all free 
peoples.‟24 More than this, terrorism was described as „a unique threat to free peoples,‟ 
„a threat to all of us,‟ and „an attack upon the world.‟25 
Secretary Shultz directly amplified Reagan‟s language when he stated that „The 
stakes in our war against terrorism therefore, are high,‟ largely because of „the damage 
that terrorism threatens to wreak on our modern civilization.‟ He went on to add: „The 
magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so great that we cannot afford to confront it 
with half-hearted and poorly organized measures,‟ and „We cannot begin to address this 
monumental challenge to decent, civilized society until we clear our heads of the 
confusion about terrorism.‟ He ended his speech by arguing that „We should be alarmed‟ 
as terrorism is „a threat to Western moral values.‟26 Inadvertently perhaps, Shultz reveals 
the purpose and function of this highly inflated language: the public should be alarmed 
and afraid, as terrorism threatens their way of life, their civilization, their moral values, 
their peace and tranquillity, and all people everywhere. By implication, any measure the 
government deems necessary in such an extreme emergency appears as reasonable, 
prudent, and commonsensical. Unchallenged by the media, this language established the 
parameters of subsequent counter-terrorism discourse, despite the reality that 
international terrorism killed less than a dozen Americans per year throughout the 
1980s.
27
 
The discursive construction of the threat of terrorism in the Bush Jr 
administration, unsurprisingly in the light of the WTC attacks, employed a hyperbolic 
language of threat that directly echoed Reagan‟s formulations. According to the 
administration, terrorism posed not just a threat of sudden violent death, but a „threat to 
civilization‟, a „threat to the very essence of what you do‟,28 a „threat to our way of life‟,29 
and a threat to „the peace of the world‟.30 The notion of a „threat to our way of life‟ is a 
cold war expression that vastly inflates the purported danger: instead of a tiny group of 
dissidents with resources that do not even begin to rival that of the smallest states, it 
implies that today‟s terrorists are as powerful as the Soviet empire was once thought to be 
with its tens of thousands of missiles and its massive conventional army. In addition, 
administration officials suggest that the threat of terrorism, like the threat of Soviet 
nuclear weapons, is supremely catastrophic: 
 
The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next time 
terrorists strike, they may well… direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or 
attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. […] [N]o rational person can 
doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to 
do so. […] [W]e are dealing with terrorists… who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in 
order to kill millions of others.
31
  
 
In other words, not only are Americans threatened by terrorists eager to kill millions, but 
this is a rational and reasonable fear to have; it is in fact, commonsensical. Americans 
should be very afraid: „If they had the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians, do 
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any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?‟.32 This is a way of normalizing the 
terrorist threat in everyday experience.  
Bush Jr administration officials then went to great lengths to explain how these 
same terrorists (who are eager to kill millions) are actually highly sophisticated, cunning, 
and extremely dangerous. As John Ashcroft expressed it: „The highly coordinated attacks 
of September 11 make it clear that terrorism is the activity of expertly organized, highly 
coordinated and well financed organizations and networks‟.33 Moreover, this is not a tiny 
and isolated group of dissidents, but „there are thousands of these terrorists in more than 
60 countries‟ and they „hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction‟;34 
or, like the story line of a popular novel: „Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the 
methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the 
world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning‟.35 In other speeches, 
officials deliberately inflated the numbers of the terrorists to „tens of thousands‟ of killers 
spread throughout the world in a terror network 
Interestingly, both Reagan and Bush Jr conflated the threat of terrorism with 
certain hostile states that were also the focus of American foreign policy; this was a 
highly politicized discursive move. For example, referring specifically to the 
phenomenon of „international terrorism‟ (itself an appellation that vastly extends and 
amplifies the geographical threat of terrorism), Reagan argued that „State-sponsored 
terrorism has increased dramatically in the last few years,‟36 and „In recent years, there‟s 
been a steady and escalating pattern of terrorist acts against the United States and our 
allies.‟37 He went on to argue that „Government-sponsored terrorism, in particular, cannot 
continue without gravely threatening the social fabric of all free societies.‟38 Importantly, 
the Reagan administration‟s continued reference to „international terrorism‟ and „state-
sponsored terrorism‟ constructs a terrifying vision of terrorism that is both vast and 
backed by the power of so-called „rogue‟ or „outlaw‟ states; this is crucial to both 
amplifying the danger and to conflating terrorists and enemy states. Conflating terrorism 
with certain states allows a „war‟ on terrorism to be re-targeted at countries which are the 
focus of American concern—and which are much easier to attack than clandestine groups 
operating in the shadows and across borders. Related to this, Reagan and his senior 
officials referred frequently to „this network of terrorist states‟, and a „confederation of 
criminal governments‟ allied with terrorist groups in „the terrorist network.‟39 This added 
a note of conspiracy to a vision of dark agents of terror operating across the globe; the 
ubiquitous phrase, „the terrorist network‟, echoed the title of Claire Sterling‟s notorious 
and deeply alarmist book about the Soviet Union as the puppet masters of global 
terrorism.
40
 Her deeply flawed treatise was highly praised by Reagan, Alexander Haig, 
William Casey, and other senior Administration officials.
41
 
Similarly, in the second „war on terrorism‟ the threat of terrorism was from a very 
early stage reflexively conflated with the threat of „weapons of mass destruction‟ and the 
„rogue states‟ who might hand them on to terrorists. According to the official discourse, 
rogue states are apparently eager to assist terrorists in killing millions of Americans, just 
as the sponsors of „international terrorism‟ were want to do in the 1980s. As Bush stated 
in his now infamous „axis of evil‟ speech, 
 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave 
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and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred.
42
  
 
This is actually an ingenious discursive sleight of hand which allows America to re-target 
its military from a war against a tiny group of individual dissidents scattered across the 
globe (an unglamorous and ultimately unwinnable war), to territorially defined states who 
also happen to be the target of American foreign policy. Dick Cheney explained it to his 
colleagues thus: „To the extent we define our task broadly, including those who support 
terrorism, then we get at states. And it’s easier to find them than it is to find bin Laden.‟43 
Perhaps more importantly, it also allows for the simultaneous pursuit of geo-strategic 
objectives in crucial regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and Central America 
under the banner of the „war on terrorism‟.44  
As measured by polling data, both the Reagan and Bush Jr administrations were 
highly successful in creating widespread public fear of terrorism and moral panics.
45
 
Again, this shows that public political discourse is rarely an accurate reflection of reality: 
the same language of threat characterized two completely different threat environments—
neither of which was (or is) particularly serious in comparison to other pressing issues. 
As David Campbell has eloquently shown, discourses of danger and foreign threat have 
been integral in constituting and disciplining American identity as practiced through its 
foreign policy.
46
 Collectivities, especially those as disparate and diverse as America, are 
often only unified by an external threat or danger; in this sense, threat creation is 
functional to political life. Historically, the American government has relied on the 
discourse of threat and danger on numerous occasions: the „red scares‟ of the native 
Americans who threatened the spread of peaceful civilization along the Western frontier 
and the workers‟ unrest at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution; the „Brown scare‟ of 
fascism during World War II; the threat to the American way of life during the cold war; 
the threat of „rogue states‟ like Libya, Panama, Iran, North Korea, and Iraq; and the 
threats posed by the drug trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
now of course, terrorism. These discourses of danger are scripted for the purposes of 
maintaining inside/outside, self/other boundaries—they write American identity—and for 
enforcing unity on an unruly and (dis)United States. 
Of course, there are other more mundane political functions for constructing fear 
and moral panic: provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain social quiescence, de-
legitimizing dissent, elevating the status of security actors, diverting scarce resources into 
ideologically driven political projects, and distracting the public from more complex and 
pressing social ills.
47
 This is not to say that terrorism poses no real threat; the dangers can 
plainly be seen in the images of falling bodies and the piles of rubble at „Ground Zero‟. 
Rather, it is to point out that dangers are those facets of social life interpreted as threats 
(in one sense, dangers do not exist objectively, independent of perception), and what is 
interpreted as posing a threat may not always correspond to the realities of the actual risk 
of harm. Illegal narcotics, for example, pose less of a risk than the abuse of legal drugs, 
but a „war on drugs‟ makes it otherwise. Similarly, the current „war on terrorism‟ is a 
multi-billion dollar exercise to protect the United States from a danger that, excluding the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, killed less Americans per year over the past three decades 
than bee stings and lightening strikes. Even in 2001, America‟s worst year of terrorist 
deaths, the casualties from terrorism were still vastly outnumbered by deaths from auto-
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related accidents, gun crimes, alcohol and tobacco-related illnesses, suicides, and a large 
number of diseases like influenza, cancer, and heart disease.  
 
Writing Identities: Evil Terrorists and Good Americans 
 
The realm of foreign policy, and particularly foreign adversaries, is enormously 
significant for „writing‟ identity.48 Foreign policy is critical for maintaining 
internal/external boundaries, and war (as a special form of foreign policy) plays a central 
role in maintaining the domains of inside/outside, foreign/domestic, self/other. This is no 
less true for a „war on terrorism‟, which is typically constructed in an epideictic rhetorical 
mode, rather than a deliberative mode.
49
 Following the rhetorical path established by 
Reagan, Bush makes appeals that attempt to unify the community and amplify its virtues; 
national character rather than national deliberation determine its actions. Moreover, the 
identification of the enemy terrorist in a „war on terrorism‟ acts as the „enabling other‟ of 
the citizenry—its negative justification.50  More than just identity maintenance then, the 
discourse of self and other in the rhetoric of counter-terrorism co-constitutes the political; 
it permits the state as practice. 
 The construction of identity in both „wars on terrorism‟ drew on a number of 
meta-narratives common to American political discourse, notably, the historic struggle of 
„civilization‟ against „barbarism.‟ This meta-narrative actually has a long genealogy in 
international relations,
51
 articulated recently in the so-called „clash of civilizations‟ thesis 
and the new imperialism debate. In both popular culture and counter-terrorism discourse, 
terrorists function as „the new barbarians‟, the epitome of savagery in the Western 
psyche.
52
 Linguistically, this trope is achieved through the natural functioning of the 
binary structure of language itself: employing the concept „civilization‟ instinctively 
brings to mind the opposite concept, „barbarism‟. In its textual usage in political and 
social conversation, the civilization-barbarism dichotomy has a number of different 
layers of meaning. On one level it evokes images of menacing nomadic armies 
attempting to conquer Christian Europe. In the context of terrorism, it implies that „the 
behavior of these new “barbarians” is uncontrollably guided by the same cruel instincts 
that motivated some of the most infamous “barbarians” of past centuries, including Attila 
the Hun and the Mongol leader Genghis Khan.‟53 On another level, the civilization 
narrative is, for Americans at least, embedded in its foundational myths: „The myth 
represents American history as an Indian war, in which white Christian civilization is 
opposed by a “savage” racial enemy: an enemy whose hostility to civilization is part of 
its nature or fundamental character, an enemy who is not just opposed to our interests but 
to “civilization itself.”‟54 In Freudian terms, we might say that the barbarians are 
representative of the id force: libidinous, irrational, violent, and dangerous. And on 
another related level, the civilized Western world is contrasted with the violent and 
barbaric Eastern world. According to Edward Said, it is a function of the way that our 
identity has been constructed; the Western person exists largely as a contrast with the 
„Oriental‟ Other.55  
The Reagan administration made frequent reference to the civilization meta-
narrative. For example, Reagan stated that terrorism constituted „a declaration of war on 
civilized society‟ and that America joined „with civilized countries in condemnation of 
terrorist outrages.‟56 In another speech, Reagan stated that „Arab nations themselves have 
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been forced to endure savage terrorist attacks from this minority. We hope and pray the 
Arab world will join us to eliminate this scourge of civilization.‟57 Of course, the savage 
nature of the terrorists is visible in „their cruelty‟, the „viciousness of their tactics‟,58 and 
their „bestial nature.‟59 George Shultz was even more explicit: terrorists commit „acts of 
brutality‟ upon „civilized society‟, they „are depraved opponents of civilization itself‟, 
and „terrorism represents a return to barbarism in the modern age.‟60 Such a formulation 
not only removes terrorists from the human community (they are quintessential „the 
enemies of all mankind‟61), but it also functions to de-politicize their motivations while 
simultaneously re-writing their actions as the expression of primitive savagery. Implicit 
within this formulation is the notion that rational political dialogue is impossible with 
terrorists; savages require control and suppression, not accommodation.  
The second „war on terrorism‟ followed an almost identical rhetorical path to 
Reagan‟s initial construction of the counter-terrorist identity. For example, the WTC 
attacks were immediately written as being symbolic of the eternal struggle between the 
forces of „barbarism‟ and „civilization‟. The attacks of „9-11‟, as administration officials 
constructed them, drew „a bright line of demarcation between the civil and the savage‟,62 
between civilized people and the terrorists that „live on the hunted margins of mankind‟,63 
and between terrorism‟s values and the „values that separate us from animals—
compassion, tolerance, mercy‟.64 This language was deliberately employed to mark a 
clear boundary between the self and the „other‟; at the same time, it functioned to 
essentialize the „other‟ as belonging to the realm of nature rather than civilization. Of 
course, the Abu Ghraib abuse photos from April 2004 destabilized this discursive binary; 
with their subliminal references to slavery era photos of Africans bound by the neck, it 
was the American soldiers who looked like barbarous savages. 
 Another key narrative in counter-terrorism discourse is the Manichean struggle 
between good and evil, a sub-plot of the civilization-barbarism narrative; counter-
terrorism campaigns invariably construct terrorists as being motivated by „evil‟ rather 
than any genuine political grievance or ideology. In the first „war on terrorism‟, Reagan 
frequently referred to „the evil scourge of terrorism‟,65 and stated that „terrorism is the 
preferred weapon of weak and evil men‟ such as the „evil man… Colonel Qadhafi.‟66 He 
argued that the world needed to „stamp out this ugly, vicious evil of terrorism.‟67 
Importantly, Reagan‟s designation of the „evil‟ of terrorism was both a deliberate 
rhetorical link to his notorious description of the Soviet Union as „an evil empire‟ that 
was „the focus of evil in the modern world‟, and a reflection of his fundamentalist 
Christian world-view. In the same evil empire speech, Reagan stated: „There is sin and 
evil in the world, and we‟re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus Christ to oppose it 
with all our might.‟68 In other words, in the discursively constructed world of ultimate 
good versus evil and The Terror Network controlled by the Soviet puppet-masters, „evil 
terrorists‟ and the „evil empire‟ were one and the same. 
Bush Jr‟s ubiquitous use of the rhetorical trope of „good and evil‟ directly echoed 
Reagan‟s initial formulation. Deeply embedded in American rhetorical traditions and 
religious life, this language functioned to essentialize the terrorists as satanic and morally 
corrupt. On the day of the WTC attacks, Bush stated that „Today, our nation saw evil, the 
very worst of human nature‟;69 in subsequent texts, he frequently referred to terrorists as 
„the evil ones‟, and „evildoers‟. These are theological terms, deployed largely for a 
Southern conservative audience, but also appealing to popular entertainment 
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understandings of „good guys‟ and „bad guys‟. In this agent/act ratio, the character of the 
terrorists precedes their actions: the terrorists did what they did because it is in their 
nature to do so—they murdered because that is what evil, demonic terrorists do.70 It is a 
powerful discourse, and an act of demagoguery, which functions to de-contextualize and 
de-historicize the actions of terrorists, emptying them of any political content, while 
simultaneously de-humanizing them. After all, there can be no deeper explanation for 
such acts, and there can be no reasoning or compromising with evil; the only right 
response is exorcism and purification.  
 Another rhetorical theme common to both „wars on terrorism‟ is the purported 
linkage between international terrorism and international communism. This is made 
explicit throughout Reagan‟s foreign policy speeches. For example, in describing his 
administration‟s policy towards Latin America, Reagan stated that the two issues, „the 
march of freedom, especially in Central America, and the fight against terrorism—are 
directly related.‟ This is because of „the strong ties of the Sandinistas to the international 
terror network‟, and „the fact that the Sandinistas have been training, supporting, and 
directing, as well as sheltering terrorists.‟71 In another speech, he spelled out the 
implications of this link: „If the Sandinistas are allowed to consolidate their hold on 
Nicaragua, we‟ll have a permanent staging ground for terrorism. A home away from 
home for Qadhafi, Arafat, and the Ayatollah—just 3 hours by air from the U.S. border.‟72 
Similarly, in justifying the invasion of Grenada, Reagan referred to the close links 
between terrorism and communism. During the invasion, American troops found a 
warehouse: 
 
This warehouse contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to 
supply thousands of terrorists. Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for 
tourism. Well, it wasn‟t. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military 
bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time. […] The 
events in Lebanon and Grenada, though Oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has 
Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct 
support through a network of surrogates and terrorists.
73
 
 
In other words, the „war against terrorism‟ is an integral part of the war against 
communism—as well as a war against barbarism and evil. 
Interestingly, the cold war meta-narrative was also employed by the Bush Jr 
administration to frame the present struggle against terrorism. As Paul Wolfowitz stated 
in prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee:  
 
The American people breathed a sigh of relief when the Cold War ended a decade ago. […] 
And there was a temptation to believe that this favorable circumstance was a permanent 
condition. On September 11th, America learned that it was not. […] This threat is as great 
as any we faced during the Cold War.
74
  
 
In this speech, Wolfowitz first links the terrorist attacks to the cold war in an opaque and 
indirect way. He draws a chronological line from the end of the cold war to the WTC 
attacks, thereby placing them in a single narrative. In addition, simply by mentioning the 
two events in such close proximity an association between them is formed. Next, 
Wolfowitz directly and explicitly compares the two conflicts, stating that they are 
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different on one level, but the same on another—they are „just as dangerous‟ as each 
other. Extraordinarily, he goes on to explicitly state that the attacks and the cold war pose 
a comparable level of threat: the threat posed by terrorism is equal to the threat of global 
nuclear annihilation at the height of the cold war. Moreover, just as the barbarism 
narrative suggests that terrorists are cruel, treacherous, and vicious, so the cold war 
framework paints them as totalitarians and soulless ideologues seeking to impose their 
„way of life‟ on subject populations. As Bush spelled it out: „In this way our struggle is 
similar to the Cold War. Now, as then, our enemies are totalitarians, holding a creed of 
power with no place for human dignity.‟75 Here, in a direct echo of Reagan, Bush is 
saying that terrorists and communists are essentially the same kind of enemy and the „war 
on terrorism‟ is just like the cold war. In one sense, Bush is re-deploying the old cold war 
argument in which the enemy is seeking to overthrow the American „way of life‟. In a 
discursive sense, „terrorism now occupies the place and function that fascism held in 
World War II and that communism held within the discourse of the cold war.‟76  
 Another crucial element in the construction of the terrorist identity lay in the 
depiction of terrorists as basically inhuman and non-human. In this regard, terrorism was 
frequently constructed employing medical metaphors. For example, Reagan frequently 
referred to the „the scourge of terrorism‟,77 arguing that decent people must „unite to 
eradicate the scourge of terror from the modern world.‟78 In a hybrid formulation that 
combined the civilization narrative with a medical metaphor, Reagan described terrorism 
as both cancerous and infectious: „If we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will 
spread like a cancer, eating away at civilized societies and fear and chaos everywhere.‟79 
Shultz echoed this formulation when he stated that „Terrorism is a contagious disease 
that will inevitably spread if it goes untreated.‟80 The key functions of this vitriolic 
language of identity are to de-politicize, demonize, and de-humanize the terrorist enemy, 
and thereby normalize a policy of violent eradication. After all, the only way to 
effectively and sensibly deal with infectious disease or „evil‟ is through physical and 
ritual purification; it is nonsensical to speak of dialogue with a „cancer‟. 
The terrorist identity is similarly inscribed in the second „war on terrorism‟. Bush 
frequently spoke of the „curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the earth‟,81 while 
Colin Powell, in a direct echo of Reagan, referred to „the scourge of terrorism‟.82 This 
medical metaphor was restated even more explicitly by Rumsfeld: „We share the belief 
that terrorism is a cancer on the human condition‟.83 Bush in turn, spoke of the danger to 
the body politic posed by „terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own‟.84 
In this construction, the terrorist was re-made as a dangerous organism that makes its host 
ill; they hide interiorly, drawing on the lifeblood of their unsuspecting hosts and 
spreading poison. This particular language is actually a precursor to the disciplinary idea 
of „the enemy within‟; terrorists are the new „reds under the bed‟. Of course, such „an evil 
and inhuman group of men‟85—these „faceless enemies of human dignity‟86—are 
undeserving of our sympathy or protection. Moreover, with hoods on terrorist suspects 
are actually „faceless‟. While it would be wrong to treat an enemy soldier inhumanely, or 
torture a criminal suspect, the same cannot be said for a parasite, a cancer, a curse.  
 At the same time that terrorists were constructed as an evil and inhuman „other‟, 
the language of counter-terrorism constructed Americans as possessing equally opposite 
(good) qualities. For example, Reagan frequently referred to „the will of the American 
people, their love for freedom, and national valor‟ and claimed to „speak for a united 
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people.‟ Frequently, he ended his speeches with the words: „We are Americans, We love 
our country, we love what she stands for, we will always defend her. We live for 
freedom.‟87 In a similar vein, Reagan described the moral qualities of the American 
people: their „well-known likeability, patience, and generosity’; „we are an easygoing 
people, slow to wrath‟; and Americans show „no limits to their national valor nor their 
consuming passion to protect this nation‟s cherished tradition of freedom.‟88 He went on 
to suggest that „by nature we prefer to solve problems peacefully.‟89 Furthermore, in 
regards to the necessity for a firm response to terrorism, „the American people are of one 
mind on this issue.‟90  
Bush Jr‟s second „war on terrorism‟ closely followed Reagan‟s scripting of 
American identity. The first major discursive inscription of the American character 
comes early on at the Prayer and Remembrance Day service on September 14, 2001. At 
this symbolically charged and constitutive pageant, Bush says: 
 
In this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that our fellow Americans are 
generous and kind, resourceful and brave. We see our national character in rescuers 
working past exhaustion; in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of citizens who have 
asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we have seen our national character in 
eloquent acts of sacrifice. […] In these acts, and in many others, Americans showed a deep 
commitment to one another, and an abiding love for our country. Today, we feel what 
Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of national unity. This is a unity of every faith, 
and every background.
91
 
 
Bush is here constructing a new world of clearly demarcated characters: where terrorists 
are cruel, „the American people‟ are generous and kind; where terrorists are hateful, 
Americans are loving; where terrorists are cowardly, Americans are brave and heroic; 
and where terrorists hide and run, Americans are united. This highlighting and 
amplification is necessary to inscribe the essential qualities of insiders and outsiders, and 
plays through a movie-based mode of the simple opposites of „good guys and bad guys‟. 
Related to this, both the Reagan and Bush Jr administrations frequently tapped 
into the „innocent Americans‟ narrative in their counter-terrorism rhetoric. The 
construction of American casualties of terrorism or war as „innocent‟ is a long-running 
feature of American political discourse and during the Reagan administration for 
example, the soldiers killed in the 1983 marine barracks bombing in Lebanon were 
recorded in official State Department records as „innocent civilians.‟92 This is reflective 
of what Richard Hughes calls a „cult of innocence‟ in American political discourse.93 In 
this foundational myth America emerges as an innocent child among nations, untainted 
by the finite dimensions of human history. As Reagan expressed it, „The calendar can‟t 
measure America because we were meant to be an endless experiment in freedom, with 
no limit to our reaches, no boundaries to what we can do, no end point to our hopes.‟94 
Rooted in a rejection of history then—„History is bunk‟—American political discourse 
(and its counter-terrorism discourse in particular) has always sought to portray its motives 
as being free from self-interest or the realpolitik of foreign policy. In this sense, America 
genuinely believes itself to be „innocent‟ of anything but pure motives and noble 
aspirations. By definition then, all victims of terrorism are „innocent‟; and through the 
natural functioning of language binaries, all terrorists are „guilty‟. 
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  Officials in both administrations also made frequent reference to the ubiquitous 
hero narrative of American popular culture. Shultz for example, stated: „I would like to 
salute the unsung heroes of the struggle against terrorism. These heroes are the 
intelligence analysts.‟95 This construction placed the „war on terrorism‟ in the mode of a 
popular movie, and reinforced the identity of „good‟ Americans fighting „cowardly‟ 
terrorists in an epic struggle of good versus evil. In the end, constructing American 
identity in this manner works discursively to enforce discipline, suppress dissent, and 
circumvent criticism; if Americans are inherently „good‟, their counter-terrorism wars are 
by definition „good wars‟. Similar to Reagan, Bush Jr‟s discourse also draws heavily on a 
„hero‟ narrative modelled on popular entertainment scripts, where every story has a cast 
of heroes and villains. The „war on terrorism‟ is no different: in a sense, every EMS 
worker on September 11 is Bruce Willis in Die Hard; every member of the armed forces 
in Afghanistan and Iraq is Tom Hanks in Saving Private Ryan; and every ordinary citizen 
is Mel Gibson in The Patriot. Rumsfeld, in a memorial service the Pentagon victims, 
constructs these all-American heroes: 
 
We remember them as heroes. […] „He was a hero long before the eleventh of September,‟ 
said a friend of one of those we have lost—„a hero every single day, a hero to his family, to 
his friends and to his professional peers.‟ […] About him and those who served with him, 
his wife said: „It's not just when a plane hits their building. They are heroes every day.‟ 
„Heroes every day.‟ We are here to affirm that.96  
 
In one sense, this could be seen simply national therapy—a way of giving meaning and 
respect to the lives lost. However, in its discursive function, it is also the inscription of 
the heroic Americans who are the opposite of the cowardly terrorists; it is the rendering 
of America‟s soldiers who are risking their lives to fight for the Homeland, freedom, and 
the safety of decent folk. Elevation to the status of hero is more than just leading by 
example, however; heroes are above criticism or moral judgment. Heroes are free to act 
as they see fit, even if it sometimes involves crossing the lines of public morality, and 
their shortcomings are quickly forgiven because by definition their motives are honest. 
In the final analysis, destroying the face of the terrorist, removing all traces of 
their personality or humanity, is essential to constructing the massive counter-violence of 
a „war on terrorism‟. After all, it would be far more difficult to bomb, torture, or hold in 
prison camps „enemy combatants‟ that were simply misguided patriots or psychologically 
ill. Simultaneously, the scripting of Americans as essentially „good‟ is a means of 
reassurance: whatever Americans do is moral and right, because it is their nature to be 
good—even if on the face of it, the victims of October 7, 2001 and March 19, 2003 look 
strikingly similar to the victims of September 11, 2001. 
 
Writing a Good War on Terrorism 
 
By this stage, it seems obvious that a „war on terrorism‟ is by definition a „good war‟:97 it 
is a war fought against the barbarous evil of terrorism, by good people, and in order to 
save liberty, civilization, and all mankind. In addition to this implicit scripting, the 
language of counter-terrorism also makes more direct appeals to good war or just war 
status, in part, as an appeal to the Christian Right—core supporters of both the Reagan 
and Bush Jr administrations. For example, Reagan legitimized the first „war on terrorism‟ 
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as justified and legal self-defense, stating that „these terrorist states are now engaged in 
acts of war against the Government and people of the United States. And under 
international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend 
itself.‟98 This is the traditional means by which states assert their right to wage war; wars 
of aggression are by definition wrong, but wars of self-defense are fully justified. Shultz 
made exactly the same claim: „The terrorists are waging war against us. And we have 
every right under international law to defend ourselves. Part of that defense is to take the 
offense.‟ 99 Interestingly, Shultz takes the argument a step further, suggesting that 
attacking other nations can be construed as part of a defensive posture. He goes on to 
assert a more profound moral right to militarily defend America against terrorism: „There 
is no room for guilt or self-doubt about our right to defend a way of life that offers all 
nations hope for peace, progress, and human dignity.‟100 There is an implicit recognition 
here that the wider international community may not accept such a broad legal argument 
for pre-emptive war, but nonetheless America has the right under Natural Law. 
 The discursive construction of counter-terrorism as legal and justified self-defense 
finds a direct echo in Bush Jr‟s second „war on terrorism‟. Under Secretary of State Marc 
Grossman, expressed it thus: 
 
I believe that Security Council resolution 1368 that was passed on the 12th of September, 
offers all of the legal basis and requirement that we need, in addition to Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, which is the right of self-defense. And we believe the United 
States was attacked on the 11th of September and that we have a right of self-defense in 
this regard.
101
  
 
Rumsfeld repeats this construction by appealing to the universal right of every nation to 
self-defense: „there is no question but that any nation on Earth has the right of self-
defense. And we do.‟102 In other words, the second „war on terrorism‟, like the first, is a 
just war because it is legally sanctioned by the authority of international law.
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Importantly, just as the Reagan administration did, the Bush Jr administration enshrined 
its right to pre-emptive or „anticipatory‟ self-defense (the so-called Bush Doctrine) in the 
National Security Strategy of September 2002. This doctrine was then used to justify the 
attack on Iraq in March 2003. 
 A second discursive strategy for constructing counter-terrorism as the pursuit of 
the quintessential „good war‟ is to define its purpose as nothing less than the pursuit of 
justice. As Reagan expressed it, the purpose of forceful counter-terrorism strategies was 
„to see that the perpetrators of terrorist acts are brought to justice.‟104 Speaking about the 
bombings and kidnappings in Lebanon, Reagan argued that the terrorists „who directed 
this atrocity must be dealt justice, and they will be.‟105 Similarly, Shultz argued that „We 
have to go on the offensive to disrupt terrorist operations, destroy their networks, and 
bring them to justice.‟106 This notion of counter-terrorism as a form of „justice‟ 
simultaneously fits both the just war narrative of having a proper casus belli (where 
revenge would not be a legitimate cause, for example), and American narratives of more 
rough and ready frontier justice (where swift retribution is viewed as necessary to 
maintaining order). Additionally, it functions as a means of legitimizing military conduct 
in war: the excesses of war may be excused in the pursuit of a just cause. 
The second „war on terrorism‟ is constructed in an identical mode. In Bush Jr‟s 
somewhat nonsensical formulation of the purposes of counter-terrorism, he stated that: 
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„Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be 
done.‟107 In the same speech, Bush injected a religious element to the counter-terrorism 
cause: „Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that 
God is not neutral between them.‟108 In other words, God is on the side of „justice‟; 
America is bringing „justice‟; therefore, by definition, God is on America‟s side. In part, 
it is this assertion of universal values and divine calling that led the Bush administration 
to initially call the Afghan campaign „Operation Infinite Justice‟; more than simply a slip 
of the tongue as it was later claimed, it was the logical choice in the construction of a 
quintessential just war. On another level, framed in the language and symbolism of the 
American frontier (note the use of Wanted Dead or Alive posters and bounties, the „Most 
Wanted Terrorists‟ featured on the popular television program America’s Most Wanted, 
and Bush‟s cowboy boots), the campaign in Afghanistan to „smoke them out of their 
holes‟109 also fits easily into America‟s rich mythology of redemptive violence; it is 
Shane, John Wayne, or Clint Eastwood exacting revenge, enforcing a kind of natural 
justice and ridding the West of dangerous villains so that decent folk can rest safe.  
 Another essential element in the construction of a good and just counter-terrorist 
war is to fix it as inherently achievable; despite the long historical record of governmental 
failure in counter-terrorism, a „war on terrorism‟ must be presented as immanently 
winnable. The Reagan administration was always clear about the ultimate outcome of the 
struggle: „Human liberty will prevail and civilization will triumph over this cowardly 
form of barbarism.‟110 Similarly, Shultz affirmed that he was „convinced that if the 
American people and our allies support our policy, we will succeed. Terrorism will ebb. 
And humanity will be saved.‟ 111 The second „war on terrorism‟ was constructed no less 
emphatically from the very first day: „we stand together to win the war against 
terrorism.‟112 Furthermore, in addressing the final outcome of the war, the grammatical 
form is always unequivocal: „we will win this conflict by the patient accumulation of 
successes‟;113 „We will fight for as long as it takes, and we will prevail‟;114 „And on the 
home front, terrorist violence must be prevented, and must be defeated. And it will be.‟115 
In fact, when asked about the length of the war—a direct reference to the chances of 
winning in a reasonable period of time—Bush replied: „People often ask me, how long 
will this last? This particular battlefront will last as long as it takes to bring al Qaeda to 
justice. It may happen a month from now; it may take a year or two. But we will 
prevail.‟116 There is no question about the outcome, even if the timeframe is a little 
vague. In this case, the certainty of victory rhetorically overwhelms the uncertainty over 
the length of the campaign; the end result—triumph—is more important than the time it 
takes to get there. 
 A final element in the construction of America‟s good „wars on terrorism‟ lies in 
the constant rhetorical links to America‟s historic calling, or America‟s „exceptionalism‟, 
which in turn is based on the universal values that America embodies. As Reagan 
expressed it: „As a world power, the United States bears global responsibilities from 
which we must not shrink in the face of cowardly attempts at intimidation.‟117 For 
Reagan, America‟s responsibilities are due in part to the fact that America is „a country 
that remains a shining city on a hill.‟118 On one level, this is another deeply religious 
metaphor, evoking the images of heaven, the new Jerusalem, and the shining light of 
Christian faith that should not remain hidden. Shultz reiterated these constructions when 
he argued that „We must not abandon… our role in the world, or our responsibilities as 
 16 
the champions of freedom and peace.‟ He went on to boldly assert that „the United States 
has a special responsibility.‟119 Again, like Reagan, Shultz based his belief in America‟s 
special responsibility on the fact that America possesses „a way of life that offers all 
nations hope for peace, progress, and human dignity.‟120 In large part, this language taps 
into the deeply held (and deeply religious) American myths of manifest destiny, Nature‟s 
Nation, the Chosen Nation, and „American exceptionalism‟.121 These beliefs are 
embedded in American political life and are discursively reflected in the Great Seal of the 
United States; in this potent symbol, God‟s eye looks down on the new order being built 
while the Latin inscription simply states: „annuit coeptis‟—„he (God) has favoured our 
undertaking‟. 
 Reagan‟s rhetorical construction of America‟s counter-terrorism responsibilities 
are replicated in the second „war on terrorism‟, although in this case they are even more 
explicitly encumbered with a sense of divine calling. Like the „indispensable‟ role of 
America in defeating nazism in World War II and communism in the cold war, Bush Jr‟s 
„war on terrorism‟ is painted as a moral obligation for the world‟s remaining superpower 
which cannot be shirked.
122
 Bush Jr for example, suggested that America had in fact, 
been given a specific responsibility by History to lead the campaign against the evil of 
terrorism: „[O]ur responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid 
the world of evil. […] [T]he commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time.‟123 
The theme of a „responsibility to history‟ was extended by Cheney‟s formulation: „The 
government of the United States has a moral duty to confront those threats, and to do 
whatever it takes to defeat them. And as the leading power, we have a further 
responsibility to help keep the peace of the world.‟124 In this language, the responsibility 
to history has been transformed into a „moral duty‟, which in part, flows from the natural 
responsibility placed on the world‟s leading power.  
 Bush Jr‟s „war on terrorism‟ then, is not just a quest for justice or a national 
security issue; it is rather a moral responsibility, an obligation—a „calling.‟ Bush Jr 
himself stated: „The advance of freedom is more than an interest we pursue. It is a calling 
we follow.‟125 Crucially, as one commentator notes, „The word “calling”, with its 
theological overtones as well as its Weberian connotations, attaches a redemptive cast to 
counterterrorism.‟126 In fact, it could also be argued that the „calling‟ of the „good war on 
terrorism‟ is a direct outcome of the earlier discursive foundation laid by the circular 
ontology of the „evil‟ discourse: „[B]ecause „terrorists‟ are evil, America is good and 
virtuous; the “Axis of Evil” implicitly positions the US and its allies as the “Axis of 
Good”. But this is not simply a binary opposition: the ontological element, the nature of 
American being, makes America only good and virtuous. It is a small step then to assume 
that you are chosen both by God and history.‟127 The official discourse therefore leaves 
no doubt that America is duty bound to once again save the world from evil. 
 In addition to a sense of historic calling, the second „war on terrorism‟ also 
invested the counter-terrorism campaign with a sense of divine calling and divine 
sanction. The repeated (and often retracted) references to the counter-terrorist war as a 
„crusade‟, which was for a short time called „Infinite Justice‟, discursively renders it a 
religious war—even a holy war.128 The writing of a good (and holy) „war on terrorism‟ 
actually began just a few days after the terrorist attacks, on September 14, 2001. This date 
was declared a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance by the President and a service 
of remembrance for the victims was held at the National Cathedral in Washington—a 
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national symbolic site where government, religion, culture and the military coalesce.
129
 
Here, in a powerful rhetorical turning point, the potent symbolism of the location and the 
ritualism of the service combined with the words of respected religious leaders and the 
President to construct a thoroughly religious conception of the coming counter-terrorist 
war. After the military‟s presentation of the colours, all of the religious dignitaries—Dean 
Baxter, Reverend Caldwell, Imam Dr Siddiqi, and the Reverend Dr Billy Graham—
echoed Bush‟s language of „evil‟ in their prayers for the nation.  
 When it was time for the President to speak, Bush Jr began by remembering the 
victims: „So many have suffered so great a loss […] We will read all these names. We 
will linger over them, and learn their stories, and many Americans will weep.‟ Following 
this discursive act of commemoration and the personalising of suffering, Bush Jr donned 
a more pastoral role, assuring the nation that the universe has a moral design, that their 
prayers were heard and understood, and that God was with them: 
 
God‟s signs are not always the ones we look for. We learn in tragedy that his purposes are 
not always our own. Yet the prayers of private suffering, whether in our homes or in this 
great cathedral, are known and heard, and understood. […] This world He created is of 
moral design. Grief and tragedy and hatred are only for a time. 
 
The most crucial point in the speech came when Bush Jr said, „War has been waged 
against us by stealth and deceit and murder‟ and as a consequence, America‟s 
„responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of 
evil‟. In the context of the site of the speech (the National Cathedral), the occasion (A 
National Day of Prayer), and the military ritualism (the presentation of the colours), this 
was a powerful call to arms. It was a call to divinely sanctioned war—a crusade against 
evil. Bush Jr ended his address by invoking God‟s blessing on the nation and asking God 
to watch over and guide America in its task. He fortified the appeal by quoting directly 
from scripture: 
 
 On this national day of prayer and remembrance, we ask almighty God to watch over 
our nation, and grant us patience and resolve in all that is to come. […] As we have been 
assured, neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present 
nor things to come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God‟s love. May He bless 
the souls of the departed. May He comfort our own. And may He always guide our 
country. God bless America.
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The discursive act of divine sanction for a kind of holy war against evil was then subtly 
reinforced by the singing of the final hymn, „Battle Hymn of the Republic‟. The opening 
stanza potently underlined Bush Jr‟s central message: 
 
Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord, 
He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored, 
He hath loos‟d the fateful lightening of His terrible swift sword, 
His truth is marching on. 
 
In a sense, Bush Jr was claiming the mantle of God‟s sword; America would march out to 
bring God‟s swift justice to the evildoers. Through the combination of language, religious 
symbolism and ritual, he appealed directly to the beliefs of millions of American 
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evangelical Christians and imbued the second „war on terrorism‟ with God‟s blessing and 
a divine sanction. Ironically, in doing so, Bush Jr reflectively mimicked the language of 
Osama bin Laden‟s initial call for holy war against the United States.131 
  
The Nature of the Counter-Terrorist Discourse 
 
There are a number of significant and interesting aspects to Reagan and Bush Jr‟s 
language of counter-terrorism. Obviously, they were both extremely powerful discourses 
that normalized a particular approach to counter-terrorism which for the most part, 
remained uncritically accepted and unquestioned except in its tactical application. Even 
the opposition Democrats never fundamentally questioned the necessity of waging a „war 
on terrorism‟, even if they sometimes debated its specific strategies.132 The ideological 
hegemony of the discourse was (and still is) aided by its relatively unmediated 
reproduction in the American media. In addition, as I have clearly demonstrated, the 
genealogy of the current „war on terrorism‟ demonstrates clear lines of discursive 
continuity with the first „war on terrorism‟ constructed by the Reagan administration. Far 
from unique then, the discourse of the current „war on terrorism‟ follows long established 
interpretive dispositions by American administrations towards the international sphere: a 
zero-sum attitude towards international action, a tendency to militarize foreign policy 
responses, a fear of internal subversion, and a sense of endangerment towards „the 
other.‟133 Part of the reason why the current discourse has been so uncritically accepted 
(particularly domestically) is because it is built on the logic of previous American 
responses to similar crises.  
Related to this, both discourses are noteworthy for their hybridity and the ease 
with which they weave disparate narratives into a single seamless story of the good fight 
against terrorism/barbarism/evil. The language powerfully combines civilization versus 
barbarism, good versus evil, cold war, and good war narratives into a new super-
narrative—a textual symphony—that legitimizes and normalizes the practice of 
American domestic and foreign policy. These powerful discursive combinations provide 
the authorities with multiple possibilities for disciplining subjects, allies, and enemies. At 
the same time, the two discourses are noted for their opacity; most of the key terms and 
phrases are never properly defined or explained, which results in their meanings having 
to be assumed or inferred through the context in which they occur. As Suman Gupta 
notes, the current „war on terrorism‟ is a discourse of „indistinct, hazy, de-
contextualised—and let‟s face it, deeply worrying—abstractions.‟134 Keeping the key 
terms of the public rhetoric deliberately opaque allows the speakers to use them in 
politically defined ways and for specific purposes, such as denigrating or de-legitimising 
particular opponents.  
 Another obvious characteristic of both discourses is their extremely gendered 
language and their reflection of traditional patriarchal male-female roles. The current 
„war on terrorism‟ for example, is actually an overwhelmingly masculine narrative full of 
stereotypical masculine heroes (firefighters and police officers, soldiers/warriors), equally 
stereotypical female victims (the oppressed women of Afghanistan, Private Jessica 
Lynch, the „Homeland‟) and an accompanying set of traditional masculine behaviours 
and images (missions to smoke bin Laden out of his cave, Wanted Dead or Alive posters, 
macho warriors battling a savage enemy). It is not simply that the discourse reflects 
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primarily masculine values, but also that women have been rendered largely invisible in 
both the media (except as victims), and more importantly, in the decision-making arena 
since September 11, 2001. Some scholars have argued that American foreign policy and 
political culture is deeply and inherently masculinized and the militarised approach to the 
„war on terrorism‟ is simply a reflection of this dominant trait. That is, the reflexive need 
to appear „tough‟ in the face of any crisis or challenge makes a war-like response appear 
natural and normal, and privileges the use of military force as a foreign policy tool—
while simultaneously silencing women‟s voices and restricting their access to political 
influence.
135
  
The gendered language of the counter-terrorism discourse however, is more than 
simply an unconscious reflection of dominant cultural attitudes; rather, as with other 
aspects of the discourse, it has an important political function—it „serves to legitimate 
certain activities and ways of thinking over others.‟136 In this sense, these discourses are 
notable for their ideological character, if we understand ideology to be „meaning in the 
service of power‟,137 or as constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, 
reproduction, and transformation of relations of domination in society.
138
 Far from being 
a neutral reflection of international realities, or the objective and dispassionate discussion 
of competing policy alternatives, counter-terrorism campaigns are both embedded within, 
and attempts to advance, ideological goals.  
The discourses are also notable for their silences and gaps—for what they omit. 
What is missing from a discourse can often be more revealing than that which is 
included. In these discourses there are a number of glaring omissions—apart from the 
missing stories about the dead and injured „innocent‟ civilians in places like Libya, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. First, there is little mention of history or context—except to 
invoke the analogies of previous „good wars‟. Some of the relevant histories which are 
missing from these „wars against terrorism‟ include: American support for terrorist 
activities against Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and left-wing rebels in Latin 
America during the 1980s; the record of American involvement in the politics of the 
Middle East—its support for Israel, its military bases in the Arabian Peninsula, its 
alliances with despotic regimes, its murky dealings with the Taliban and the Mujahaddin 
before them, and its oil politics; the history and context of al Qaeda‟s decade long 
struggle against American policy in the region; the global context of state failure and 
breakdown, arms trading (America being the world‟s largest dealer of weapons), and 
increasing levels of state and sub-state violence and disorder; and the histories and 
lessons of other nations‟ struggles against terrorism, such as Israel, Northern Ireland, 
Italy, Germany, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya—to name a few.  
 There is also a missing political dimension. Counter-terrorist war is defined as a 
struggle between „good‟ and „evil‟ rather than as a contest over policies, ideologies, or 
global military, political and economic structures; never heard are the political aims of 
the terrorists. There is also an absence of discussion regarding the broad range of counter-
terrorist policies available to governments, particularly non-military based methods. 
Instead of acknowledging that there are a great many models and paradigms for dealing 
with terrorism—legal and policing-based approaches, diplomatic and political 
approaches, conciliatory approaches, long-term structural approaches—it is axiomatically 
assumed that military and repressive approaches are the only rational and realistic 
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options. These silences are not merely accidental omissions; they are deliberate 
exclusions, designed to ensure that no challenge is made to the dominant paradigm.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The approach to counter-terrorism constructed during the Reagan administration has by 
now been thoroughly legitimized, institutionalized, and normalized. Alarmingly, the core 
of the discourse relies on an approach to counter-terrorism that has historically proved to 
be of limited effectiveness, and through the privileging of some forms of knowledge over 
others, excludes other potentially more effective counter-terrorist strategies. In particular, 
it is obvious that the moral absolutism at the heart of the discourse induces a form of 
political amnesia about the importance of political dialogue, winning hearts and minds, 
and political reform as more effective counter-terrorism strategies, for example.
139
 More 
fundamentally, the discourse misconceives and misunderstands the nature of the terrorist 
threat; it constitutes poor „threat assessment‟, to use military parlance. In other words, by 
failing to understand the history and context of terrorism, the actual nature and causes of 
terrorism, and the real motivations and aims of terrorists (who most certainly do not 
sacrifice their lives in suicidal attacks simply for the sake of „evil‟), counter-terrorism 
discourse undermines the search for more effective and long-term policy solutions. 
Disturbingly, the dominance of the current discourse may mark out the meaning and role 
of American counter-terrorist policies for decades to come, regardless of their actual 
impact on security. 
 Another very real danger is that American counter-terrorism, as it is currently 
constructed and practiced, is actually making terrorism worse through the entrenchment 
of cycles of violence and counter-violence; that just as has already occurred in Israel, 
Chechnya, Kashmir, Colombia, Algeria, Spain, and other places, it is making the world 
less secure, more violent, and more unjust, and creating self-fulfilling prophesies—where 
„terrorism foretold must become prophesy fulfilled at some point.‟140 There is a real risk 
of constructing a situation of perpetual war where terrorism and counter-terrorism 
become indistinguishable; where the discursive practices of a „war on terrorism‟ echo and 
mimic the absolutist mentality and exceptionalist tactics of terrorists themselves.
141
 
Moreover, there is a genuine danger that the „war on terrorism‟ may damage society 
through weakening democratic values and undermining the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions, particularly the judicial system, the police, and the security services. 
Historically, the construction and reproduction of the „security state‟ has tended to lead to 
a narrowing of civic culture and political life—the constriction of politics through 
demonising an ever-widening variety of dissent.
142
 In short, the construction of counter-
terrorism in this mode threatens to transform the „war on terrorism‟ into a „war of 
terrorisms‟. 
 The discourse and practice of counter-terrorism in its current form leads to the de-
legitimizing of dissent and the narrowing of the discursive space for political debate. In 
recent times we have witnessed conservative attacks on anti-globalization protesters, 
academics, postmodernists, liberals, pro-choice activists, environmentalists, and gay 
liberationists as being aligned with terrorism and its inherent evil.
143
 The moral taxonomy 
of the good versus evil construction in particular, is extremely corrosive of democratic 
politics because it undermines the possibility of a loyal opposition.
144
 Moreover, the 
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invocation of evil is a powerful tool for ending arguments and displacing more complex 
understandings of political and social events; the suffocating logic of the discourse makes 
it exceedingly difficult to think clearly about the terrorist attacks and the counter-terrorist 
campaign that has followed.
145
  
 Finally, there are real dangers for the stability of the international system itself. 
There is the danger of de-stabilizing already unstable regions through the application of 
pre-emptive war doctrines (the operative conclusion of the discourse) by states that are 
fighting insurgencies and terrorist campaigns of their own. Many of these states—Russia, 
China, Algeria, India, Israel, Macedonia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Zimbabwe—have already 
re-framed their struggles against internal dissidents as local „wars on terrorism‟ as a way 
of both muting international criticism and garnering external support. Additionally, there 
is little doubt that the Iraq war phase of the „war on terrorism‟—like the attack on Libya 
years before it—undermined institutions of global governance, particularly the United 
Nations, and weakened international rules and norms.  
 If these and other dangers are to be avoided, scholars and citizens must first 
reclaim the right to question and debate the profound policy issues that lie at the heart of 
any „war on terrorism‟, and must challenge the normative foundations of counter-terrorist 
violence. In large part, such an engagement with hegemonic power will only be possible 
when the deconstruction of the discursive straightjacket we are currently trapped within 
begins in earnest. 
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